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Abstract—The transparent and decentralized characteristics
associated with blockchain can be both appealing and prob-
lematic when applied to a healthcare use-case. As health data
is highly sensitive, it is also highly regulated to ensure the
privacy of patients. At the same time, access to health data and
interoperability is in high demand. Regulatory frameworks such
as GDPR and HIPAA are, amongst other objectives, meant to
contribute to mitigating the risk of privacy violations in health
data. Blockchain features can likely improve interoperability and
access control to health data, and at the same time, preserve or
even increase, the privacy of patients. Blockchain applications
should address compliance with the current regulatory frame-
work to increase real-world feasibility. This exploratory work
indicates that published proof-of-concepts in the health domain
comply with GDRP, to an extent. Blockchain developers need to
make design choices to be compliant with GDPR since currently,
none available blockchain platform can show compliance out of
the box.
Index Terms—Blockchain, DTL, health data, GDPR, privacy
regulations
I. INTRODUCTION
The current status in data privacy could be categorized as
the post-privacy area due to the unintended consequences of
the big data revolution. The famous Cambridge Analytica
scandal [1] is an example of how re-identification can be
achieved by cross-analyze of large data sets containing private
information. The technology revolution that has driven us
to post-privacy has not been stopped through privacy acts
such as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). We are
currently in another (r)evolution that can restore data privacy
- blockchain.
In 2018, The European Union instituted the GDPR [2],
which regulates the collection, processing and securing of
personal data, including protected health information (PHI).
Art. 4(15) of the EU GDPR, defines data concerning health
as: personal data related to the physical or mental health of a
natural person, including the provision of healthcare services,
which reveal information about his or her health status.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPPA) is essential for U.S. healthcare law and deals mainly
with privacy rights and access rather than ownership of patient
data [3]. Each state has ownership of patient data of its
citizens, and it is controlled by respective state law, in this
case. Since there are 50 states, there are 50 differing laws,
court cases and interpretations of that ownership of patient
data. New Hampshire has as the only state enacted legislation
stating that patient data ownership lies with the patient. How
GDPR will interact and comply with U.S. state laws remains
to be determined.
Blockchain, first introduced with the launch of Bitcoin back
in 2008 has become more diluted in its definition, and there
is currently no fixed, widely accepted definition of the term
blockchain. To clarify its use in this research we have defined
Blockchain as a distributed, de-centralized and tamper-proof
ledger without any centralized control. Blockchain technology
and other Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) could in-
crease our data privacy and empower individuals with control
and access over their data, including health data.
The objective of this study is twofold: (i) to dissect the
various designs of blockchain and explore GDPR compliance
for different components in established or proposed blockchain
applications in the healthcare sector and, (ii) to provide a
future researcher with guidance in how to comply with GDPR
when designing blockchain application within the healthcare
domain.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides a brief introduction to blockchain technology and
outlines previous work addressing blockchain compliance with
GDPR; Section III presents the research approach; Section IV
describes four blockchain applications in healthcare identified
through the literature; Section V presents our results and
analysis; Section VI provides a discussion and conclusion to
the work, and gives a recommendations for future work.
II. GDPR AND BLOCKCHAIN
This section gives a brief introduction to blockchain and
GDPR. We can broadly categorize blockchain as; public per-
missionless, private permissioned and federated permissioned.
The categorization is important in order to design applications
in relevant sectors to achieve social and economic goals. In
a public blockchain, everyone in the network holds equal
rights and the ability to access the ledger. While nodes
need to be certified to join the consensus process in private
and federated, which makes them permissioned. The French
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National Commission on Informatics and Liberty (CNIL)
recommends private permissioned blockchains because of the
compliance with GDPR [4]. The third blockchain category is
a combination between public and private, which are referred
to as a federated or hybrid blockchain [5].
Previous research has explored blockchain platforms and
their feasibility for healthcare [6] and concluded that none
of the most widely used blockchain platforms were ideal for
healthcare, out of the box. Other work has identified important
properties and characteristics in different types of blockchain,
and they need to be considered in the initial design phase;
identity management, efficiency according to energy use, im-
mutability, ownership management and transaction approval
[5]. Public, private and federated blockchains handle these
properties differently and each component may have their
limitation [7].
As detailed by the European Union Blockchain Observa-
tory and Forum [4], in principle, there are no contradictions
between the goals of GDPR and DLT. However, there seem to
be at least three areas in which GDPR still does not offer
enough clarity about how real-world DLT applications for
the health sector should be developed: (1) accountability and
roles (e.g., how to identify a data controller in a public DLT),
(2) anonymization of personal data (e.g., which techniques
are sufficient to anonymize personal data to the point where
the resulting output can potentially be stored in a DLT), and
(3) GDPR rights conflicts (e.g., how to rectify or remove
personal data that are recorded in a DLT that is immutable
by nature, or who is responsible for requesting and managing
the freely, specific, informed, and unambiguous consent from
a data subject, especially if the data controller is not specified)
[8]. With regards to the anonymization of personal data, it is
clear that GDPR does not apply to anonymized data and that
this type of information can be stored on the open ledger.
However, what qualifies as anonymized is still not clear. The
only indication today is that it must be irreversibly impossible
to identify an individual through any of the means reasonably”
likely to be used [9].
Smart contracts are one of the components that have been
proposed on blockchain platforms to reduce the need for a
third party. It enables a new type of autonomous regulation that
executes transactions when all the requirements are fulfilled
[10]. All legal rules and contracts are transposed into digital
and software rules, which means smart contract is the new
regulator in the blockchain network and rules are followed
accordingly [11]. For example, after a user authenticates its
digital identity successfully, smart contract can grant autho-
rization and access his/her accurate medical records to the
requestors [12]. However, Giordanengo [13] analyzed some
use cases of smart contracts and found out that none of the
studies have reached the stage of production and concluded
that it is not ready for implementation in healthcare domain.
The design options in a blockchain application are wide,
and there is an increase research and innovation in this
field. To design blockchain applications for healthcare use-
cases, there are several important design choices the developer
has to make, with the three most prominent: (1) choice of
platform/network, (2) on/off chain data storage and (3) identity
solution for interaction with the system.
A. Related work
This section highlights previous work which has investi-
gated blockchain compliance with GDPR. There is limited
published research under this topic in the literature, but
previous work has indicated the need for standardization [6],
[7], [14].
Two reports published by EU entities: The EU blockchain
Observatory and Forum - Blockchain and the GDPR [4]
and the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) -
Blockchain and the general data protection regulation [15]
provide guidance in blockchain compliance with GDPR.
Blockchain and the GDPR is a thematic report published in
2018 where accountability and roles, as well as anonymization
of personal data, are addressed. This report highlights the
need for each blockchain use-case to be thoroughly analyzed
and rated in various interpretations - compliance with GDPR
is not about the technology but rather, how it is used. The
report also points out the need to avoid storing personal
data on a public blockchain and anonymous data techniques
such as obfuscation, encryption and aggregation should be
used. The report proposed some principles to consider when
designing blockchain architectures such as; considering user
perspective, analysing where the personal data appears and
who is responsible for the processing.
Blockchain and the GDPR report has defined roles for three
main actors: data subject, data controller and data processor,
and it is outlined in the report that it can be problematic to
identify the data controller in blockchains. The report also
presents some techniques, such as reversible encryption and
hashing, to achieve anonymous or pseudo-anonymous data,
which is under intense debates. It is also important to consider
if personal data should be involved when linking private chains
with public chains.
In the report by the European Parliamentary Research Ser-
vice, blockchain is defined as a combination of many different
forms of distributed databases that present variation, both
in complexity and governance agreement. The report gives
an account of difficulties in whether personal data, can be
anonymized to the extant that it meet the GDPR threshold of
anonymization. Two types of compliance tension is expressed:
(1) GDPR assumes that there is a data controller, which
often is not the case in blockchains and (2) the right to
be forgotten, which is problematic in an immutable ledger.
Taking into evaluation some properties in the infrastructure
level on blockchains, it is suggested possible controllership
and reflect on the nexus between responsibility and control.
Furthermore, it is expressed that it is difficult to assess the
compatibility between blockchain and GDPR without having
to pay attention to the nuances in blockchain configurations.
There is also a request for further clarifications of concepts
such as ”anonymous data”, ”data controller” and the meaning
of ”erasure” under Art. 17.
There are some examples where blockchains compliance
with GDPR is tested, such as a proof-of-concept (PoC) devel-
oped by Hawig et al. [16] for the use case of blood glucose
data. They examined a system for immutable, interoperable
and GDPR compliant data exchange. In this PoC, they high-
light that blockchain has a great potential to improve infor-
mation transactions in a secure and transparent way between
patients and providers [16]. They tested two possible solutions
based on the public IOTA blockchain and in combination with
public IOTA plus, a private IPFS (InterPlanetary File System)
cluster. In the public IOTA it became difficult to eliminate the
risk of personal data linkability, and combining a public DLT
and IPFS has a high degree of complexity. They also highlight
that there are limitations in identifying a data controller since
the public DLT ecosystem is formed by multiple health care
stakeholders, as well as patient consent management. They
argue that each use-case must be carefully considered when
blockchain-based system is designed for health data exchange.
One private blockchain is suggested in the CUREX project,
which is argued to have GDPR compliance by design in a
decentralized architecture [17]. In this project, they argue that
all data transactions in health sectors and their vulnerability
depend on private blockchain infrastructure to integrity of
risk management. The CUREX project’s goal is to ensure the
integrity of the risk assessment process of all data transactions.
Two other suggested GDPR-compliant design concepts that
address health data collected by sensors in different types of
mobile and smart devices. Both designs were described to
address the vulnerability in centralised data storage controlled
by service providers, and the ”right to own and share personal
information”. One of the concepts is combining blockchain
with cloud storage and machine learning techniques to give
users the possibility to share personal data easily and securely.
In this model, the data is encrypted before uploading it to
the cloud storage and secured by the hash function. The
access to the data is split and distributed among multiple
key keepers, and no visible personal information is involved
because the blockchain allows pseudonyms [18]. While Zheng
et al. considered the limits blockchain has to store large-
size data that are continuous-dynamic, Hossein et al. propose
architecture for efficient access and control mechanisms [19].
In their work, the privacy challenge was addressed, and their
design concept is an efficient privacy-preserving access to give
the users full control over their own data.
III. METHOD
The research approach in this work has been: (i) review
of four different blockchain proof-of-concepts for healthcare;
(ii) review of GDPR and how the regulations apply to health
informatics; and (iii) an exploratory analysis how the platforms
reviewed in (i) comply with the relevant articles identified in
(ii).
The blockchain based proof-of-concepts in (i) were iden-
tified through a scoping search in PubMed and Scopus. The
following documents were identified and utilized in (ii):
• GDPR (official document) [2];
• Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation
[20].
IV. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED HEALTHCARE APPLICATIONS
This section describes four different blockchain applications
that were identified in a scoping search in PubMed and scopus.
These four applications were included based on their different
architecture. MedRec [21] is a blockchain-based solution for
personal control of identity and the distribution of health
information. The system is designed on the public Ethereum
blockchain. This means that transactions, including metadata
which is sensitive in medical context, are visible to everyone
who has access to the blockchain. And if someone can identify
the patient’s real world identity and Ethereum account, one
can determine the relationship between the health providers
and the patients. In order to circumvent this privacy issue,
MedRec anonymized metadata through disassociating each pa-
tient’s identity from the provider, where each provider makes
a new identity Ethereum account for each patient-provider
relationship. The purpose is to enable patients to establish
public relations without revealing the real-world identities.
EMRshare [22] is a health data sharing application where
different entities such as health provider, data scientists and pa-
tients interact using the permissioned Hyperledger blockchain.
Transactions such as health data requests, approval or rejection
action is stored on the blockchain. While actual medical data
are stored off-chain and encrypted with asymmetric encryption
for security purposes. EMRShare also enables patients, the
data owner, to anonymize their name or identity in the medical
records before reaching the requestors.
VerifyMed [23], [24], [25] is a public Ethereum blockchain
platform with the aim to validate the authorization and com-
petence of healthcare workers in a virtualized healthcare
environment. VerifyMed enables healthcare workers to doc-
ument their work history and competence in the form of
a de-centralized portfolio. VerifyMed combines and stores
three forms of data items (evidence of authority, evidence
of experience and evidence of competence) to build their
portfolios. Digital signatures scheme is also incorporated in
VerifyMed to ensure ownership is established on each verified
evidence. As an example of how a typical user interface looks
like in a blockchain-based application, we give Figure 1, which
is taken from VerifyMed[24], [25].
FHIRChain [26]) is a public Ethereum blockchain archi-
tecture for secure and scalable clinical data sharing with
the goal to meet the requirements of The Office of the
National Coordinator for the Health Information Technology
(ONC) such as privacy preserving and health information
security. FHIRchain stores encrypted metadata on the network
rather than storing encrypted sensitive health data. It uses
digital health identity, which utilizes public-key cryptography
to generate and manage the identities. Often clinical data
research data format and structures varies from institution to
institution, which makes data sharing challenging, FHIRChain
is developed based on HL7 Fast Healthcare Interoperability
Fig. 1. Page from the User Interface of VerifyMed for showing details about
all data related to a healthcare worker [24], [25].
Resources (FHIR) to enforce consistent data formats for easier
information sharing.
These proposed blockchain concepts within the healthcare
domain primarily focus on solving interoperability without
compromising the privacy and security of sensitive health data.
Identity management for both patients and health workers is
also considered as part of the proposed applications. However,
the research work focusing on the degree of compliance to
GDPR and other health data regulatory frameworks remains
limited.
V. RESULTS
The results are presented mainly in Table I - relevance of
GDRP for healthcare and analysis of compliance and Table II
- Comparative analyses.
GDPR will have a significant impact on the healthcare
sector in collecting, processing, and securing protected health
information. Healthcare institutions (HI), are obligated to
ensure that data is collected for a specific and legitimate use
and that the data is only used for that purpose. Further, a
healthcare organization will be required to obtain exclusive
consent or permission from the patient (the data subject) to
use their data according to (Art. 7).
GDPR indicates that the ownership of health data should be
with the patients, enabling patients to have greater autonomy
over their data. Healthcare providers are obligated to furnish
patients with complete information when they request it,
within specified time limits (Art. 15).
Additionally, GDPR requires organizations to report a data
breach within 72 hours of learning of the breach (Art. 33),
and notify the affected individual if the breach results in an
adverse impact (Art. 34). The onus will, therefore, be on
healthcare organizations to ensure that data is highly secured
and protected from unauthorized access or face rapid reporting
requirements of breaches and possible severe financial penal-
ties (see Art. 83). This is important when it comes embracing
new digital technologies like blockchain because issues such
as misuse of patients’ PHI would result in losing trust in
healthcare institutions and delaying the adoption of blockchain
in enhancing information sharing.
Table I summarizes what healthcare institutions (HI) must
consider when using blockchain and DLT to secure and protect
PHI and avoid costly fines for non-compliance.
Blockchain structure can enhance the traceability of data
making transactions auditable and transparent. In addition,
storing data on the blockchain ledger could increase data
integrity due to the inherited immutability property. However,
any form of information stored on blockchain remains on
blockchain and it might be violating GDPR since patients
should have the right to erase their personal data. Although, it
is common that national health data law prohibits the deletion
of patient data from medical health records. Storing metadata
could be an alternative to storing the full dataset. Storing
metadata on the blockchain can pseudonymize a patient’s
identity and to further protect patient’s identity, encryption
technology such as zero-knowledge proofs could be imple-
mented to prevent any forms of identification [27].
Table II presents a summary of how four different
blockchain-based applications (presented under Section IV)
comply with the relevant GDPR articles presented in Table
I.
All four concepts use slightly different components of
blockchain technologies. For example, FHIRchain uses a pub-
lic blockchain (Ethereum) while EMRShare uses a permis-
sioned blockchain (Hyperledger). These blockchains vary in
some properties, such as the degree of visibility, but both
types of blockchains can store transaction chronological with
high data integrity due to the immutable structure. Blockchain
data structure is easily auditable, which can make it inherited
compliant with Art 30 and 35.
Identity management also forms a core technology in all
TABLE I
RELEVANCE OF GDPR FOR HEALTHCARE
Article in GDPR Compliance Impact in healthcare
Art. 30 (Records of processing
activities), Art. 35 (Data
protection impact assessment)
Able to conduct information audit
to demonstrate GDPR compliance
HI is required to keep an up-to-date and detailed
list of their processing activities using a data
protection impact assessment. The list should
include the purposes of the processing, what kind
of data you process and who has access to it in the
organization
Art. 6 (Lawfulness of
processing), Art. 7 (Conditions
for consent)
Legal justification for processing
health data
HI can justify the purpose according to one of the
six conditions. E.g Patients has given consent for
the processing. Extra obligation such as the
opportunity to revoke consent must be available to
patients
Art. 12 (Transparent
information, communication
and modalities for the exercise
of the rights of the data subject)
Clear information about the data
processing and legal justification
in privacy policy
HI is obligated to inform patients that health data is
collected. HI should explain why this is collected,
how it is processed, who has the access and how it
is secured using clear and plain language,
particularly when addressing specifically to a child.
Art. 33 (Notification of a
personal data breach to the
supervisory authority), Art. 34
GDPR (Communication of a
personal data breach to the
data subject)
Have a process to notify the
authorities in the event of a data
breach
HI is required to notify the supervisor authority in
their jurisdiction within 72 hours learning of the
health data breached or exposed. Patients should be
notified without undue delay in plain language, if
the breach is likely to put them at risk.
Art. 32 (Security of processing)
Encrypt, pseudonymize or
anonymize personal data
whenever possible
HI is to encrypt, pseudonymize or anonymize PHI
whenever feasible.
Art. 25 (Data protection by
design and by default), Art. 5
(Principles relating to
processing of personal data)
Data protection is considered at
all times, including at the
beginning of developing a product
HI should implement appropriate technical
(encryption) and organizational measures(deleting
patients data that is no longer needed) to protect
data. HI which adheres to data protection principles
when processing of personal data is involved.
Art. 25 (Data protection by
design and by default)
Designated person for ensuring
GDPR compliance across the
organization
HI should designate someone that is accountable
for GDPR compliance which includes evaluation of
data protection policies and the implementation of
policies. HI should be able to verify the patient’s
identity.
Art. 15 (Right of access by the
data subject)
Able to verify the patients’
identity
HI is obligated to furnish patients with complete
information when they request it and should be
able to comply within a month. HI should be able
to verify the patient’s identity.
Art. 17 (Right to erasure/ right
to be forgotten)
Easy to delete personal data upon
request
Patients should have the right to request to delete
all health data and HI should honour their request
within a month. HI may have grounds to deny the
request such as compliance with a legal obligation.
HI should be able to verify the patient’s identity.
Art. 18 (Right to restriction of
processing)
Easy to stop data processing upon
request
Patients can request HI to restrict or stop
processing their health data if certain grounds
apply, such as dispute about the lawfulness of the
processing. HI may be allowed to keep storing their
data although the processing is restricted.
Art. 24 (Responsibility of the
controller)
Establish the responsibility and
liability of the controller
Any processing of personal data carried out by HI
or on HIs behalf, responsibilities should be
established which includes implementing
appropriate technical and organisational measures.
This is to ensure and to be able to demonstrate that
processing is performed lawfully
Art. 20 (Right to data
portability)
Easy to receive a copy of your
personal data and share with
another in a simple format
From a privacy standpoint, GDPR offers higher
patients autonomy over their data, instead of HI.
This means patients should be able to receive health
data in a readable format or share with other HI.
these frameworks. This is one of the key compliance to
Art 15. ”Right access by the right data”, before executing
requests from patients to obtain health information or stop
processing their health data. This is to prevent any misuse
of private health data by the wrong person. For example,
FHIRChain adopts digital identity to verify and authenticate
the identity of clinicians. VerifyMed does not incorporate
identity management to authenticate as the application utilizes
TABLE II
COMPARATIVE ANALYZES
Feature GDPR article Blockchain applicationMedRec EMRshare FHIRchain VerifyMed
Able to conduct information audit to
demonstrate GDPR compliance
Art. 30 GDPR (Records of
processing activities) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Art. 35 GDPR (Data protection
impact assessment) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Legal justification for processing
health data
Art. 6 GDPR (Lawfulness of
processing)) N/A N/A Yes N/A
Art. 7 GDPR (Conditions for
consent) N/A Yes Yes N/A
Clear information about the data
processing and legal justification in
privacy policy
Art. 12 GDPR (Transparent
information, communication and
modalities for the exercise of the
rights of the data subject)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Have a process to notify the author-
ities in the event of a data breach
Art. 33 GDPR (Notification of a
personal data breach to the
supervisory authority)
No No No No
Art. 34 GDPR (Communication of a
personal data breach to the data
subject)
No No No No
Data protection is considered at all
times, including at the beginning of
developing a product
Art. 25 GDPR (Data protection by
design and by default) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Art. 5 GDPR (Principles relating to
processing of personal data) N/A N/A N/A N/A
Encrypt, pseudonymize or
anonymize personal data whenever
possible
Art. 32 GDPR (Security of
processing) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Designated person for ensuring
GDPR compliance across the
organization
Art. 25 GDPR (Data protection by
design and by default) No No No No
Should be able to verify the patients
identity.
Art. 15 GDPR (Right of access by
the data subject) Yes Yes Yes No
Easy to delete personal data upon
request
Art. 17 GDPR (Right to erasure/
right to be forgotten) No No No No
Easy to stop data processing upon
request
Art. 18 GDPR (Right to restriction
of processing) N/A No N/A No
Establish the responsibility and
liability of the controller
Art. 24 GDPR (Responsibility of the
controller) No No No No
Easy to receive a copy of your
personal data and share with
another in a simple format
Art. 20 GDPR (Right to data
portability) Yes Yes Yes No
evidence of authority to proof the credential of the clinicians.
Table II highlights that the blockchain blockchain concepts
identified for this work did not fulfill the requirement of the
right to forgetting (Art. 17). Patients can have the right to
request for deletion of their information but the immutability
nature of blockchain contradicts this article. To circumvent
this, proposed concepts, such as FHIRchain, only stores meta-
data and protected with encryptions. Although it is not erasure,
it prevents an unauthorized person from obtaining information
and linking the pseudonymized metadata to patient’s identity.
Currently, the four explored concepts did not state any proce-
dures to notify authorities if any violation of GDPR is detected
and might therefore lack compliance with (Art 33). A smart
contract can be designed by sending a notification to relevant
authorities when a breach is detected. In addition to that, a
designated person for ensuring GDPR compliance within the
network should be considered for future work.
VI. DISCUSSION
There is an increased focus on blockchain technology in
healthcare sector in both academic spheres and the private
sector with the expectation that this technology could have a
positive impact on achieving better interoperability and access
to health data [28]. This can bring medical advances, such as
enabling collaborative treatment and care decision. However,
storing patient’s health data or even metadata is considered
highly sensitive and could violate patient’s data privacy. In
order to protect patient’s health data, GDPR has defined rules
and guidelines to ensure data processing and handling comply.
However, research focusing on the degree of compliance of
proposed blockchain solutions to GDPR in the healthcare
sector remains limited.
The contribution of this paper explores how four differ-
ent blockchain-based healthcare applications comply with the
identified articles in GDPR. This analysis can provide further
research guidance on how to achieve GDPR compliance and
what architectural design choices that need to be considered.
As outlined under Section VI, compliance with Art 30 and
35 are achieved in the four healthcare applications identified
due to the inherited characteristics of blockchain - storage
of transaction chronological with high data integrity. Identity
management is a core technology for healthcare application
and it is also a key compliance factor in GDPR with Art
15: Right access by the right data. This is mainly to prevent
any misuse of private health data by the wrong person and
compliance is achieved with three out of the four concepts.
Currently, none of the proposed concepts did fulfill the
requirement of the right to be forgotten (Art 17), as shown in
Table II. This indicates that patients should have the right to
request the deletion of their information. However, this is often
regulated by national health data laws that prohibit the deletion
of data from medical health records. Nevertheless, compliance
with this article is problematic due to the immutable nature of
blockchain. Compliance can be achieved by making all data
stored on the ledger entirely anonymous or fully encrypted.
Hence, we encourage researchers to explore full anonymity in
blockchain applications for this domain.
None of the investigate blockchain concepts did consider the
process of notifying authorities if any violation of GDPR is
detected stated in Art. 33 as shown in Table II. This could
potentially be implemented by a smart contract to ensure
automated and imitate notifications to relevant authorities
upon data breach. A way to ensure that any new blockchain
solutions that handle sensitive health data comply with GDPR,
is to keep an up-to-date lists using Data Protection Impact
Assessment (DPIA)(Art. 35) to any authorities or regulators
upon requests. This can avoid any solution providers from
subjecting to severe penalties (fines of up to 20 million dollars
or 4 percent of annual revenue whichever is higher [2]) and
losing trusts from its users. Therefore, researchers should
ensure Art. 33 and 35 are in place before deployment in the
real-world scenario.
A. Conclusion
Blockchain compliance with GDPR for healthcare applica-
tions is highly dependent on how the technology is utilized
and the architectural design. It seems infeasible to conclude
that specific blockchain frameworks or main blockchain char-
acteristics are more compliant than others, it is rather use-case
dependent and based on several design aspects that together
could build up towards GDPR compliance. This research
shows that blockchain may enhance GDPR in some aspects
and be challenging with some others. It is important that this
topic is being addressed and highlight potential compliance
issues to increase adoption and acceptance of the technology
in this field. There is no such thing as GDPR-compliant
blockchain technology for healthcare, but it might be GDPR-
compliant use cases and applications. We encourage future
work to address GDPR compliance to get closer to real-world
adoption of blockchain technology in the healthcare sector.
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